Richard Gipps
—
Good old fashioned psychotherapy is SO MANY DIFFERENT THINGS. Some of the following overlap a little, but what interests me is making a list of *mutually irreducible therapeutic endeavours*. […]
1. Sometimes I'm 'just' a trustworthy recognition-affording ear. My patient's thoughts & feelings spontaneously up-well, self-organise, firm up in my presence. Her subjectivity then blooms; now she can grow as a person. It can feel to me like I'm "just listening" while she's doing all the work. Listening to dreams can be like this. Leave aside interpretation for a moment, and think on how very personal they are. My interest in someone's dreams; my recollection of them sometimes years later: it's truly an interest in them.
2. Sometimes my patient is over-burdened. Her problems aren't particularly 'inner' except in that her constitution is non-Herculean. But a life-problem articulated, heard: it's more bearable. Nearly all therapy should sometimes be - but not only be! - supportive therapy.
3. Sometimes there's been a developmental dearth of "good objects". My patient remains timid, lacks virtue clarity, knows not how to self-soothe/encourage. But if I can naturally model courage, clarity re asserting needs / being aptly accommodating to others, mentalising, owning my faults, making amends, appropriate self-concern and self-care, then they now can grow through identifying with / internalising me for a while. Making some gentle noise for an ethic of love: this is important too I think.
4. Sometimes my patient who suffers a depressive deficit in self-assertion, or is overly empathic and bleeds out into others, benefits not through identification but through being challenged, stood up to, by me. I refuse the tacit invitation to see him as helpless and his pain as inexorable. I gently and firmly suggest: think and live otherwise.
5. Sometimes a patient needs to rehearse out loud the new self-understandings he's arrived at over the week. It helps him firm these up. It makes it all more real, less solipsistic. I can offer acknowledgement to these efforts and also say if something doesn't really sound right.
—
Good old fashioned psychotherapy is SO MANY DIFFERENT THINGS. Some of the following overlap a little, but what interests me is making a list of *mutually irreducible therapeutic endeavours*. […]
1. Sometimes I'm 'just' a trustworthy recognition-affording ear. My patient's thoughts & feelings spontaneously up-well, self-organise, firm up in my presence. Her subjectivity then blooms; now she can grow as a person. It can feel to me like I'm "just listening" while she's doing all the work. Listening to dreams can be like this. Leave aside interpretation for a moment, and think on how very personal they are. My interest in someone's dreams; my recollection of them sometimes years later: it's truly an interest in them.
2. Sometimes my patient is over-burdened. Her problems aren't particularly 'inner' except in that her constitution is non-Herculean. But a life-problem articulated, heard: it's more bearable. Nearly all therapy should sometimes be - but not only be! - supportive therapy.
3. Sometimes there's been a developmental dearth of "good objects". My patient remains timid, lacks virtue clarity, knows not how to self-soothe/encourage. But if I can naturally model courage, clarity re asserting needs / being aptly accommodating to others, mentalising, owning my faults, making amends, appropriate self-concern and self-care, then they now can grow through identifying with / internalising me for a while. Making some gentle noise for an ethic of love: this is important too I think.
4. Sometimes my patient who suffers a depressive deficit in self-assertion, or is overly empathic and bleeds out into others, benefits not through identification but through being challenged, stood up to, by me. I refuse the tacit invitation to see him as helpless and his pain as inexorable. I gently and firmly suggest: think and live otherwise.
5. Sometimes a patient needs to rehearse out loud the new self-understandings he's arrived at over the week. It helps him firm these up. It makes it all more real, less solipsistic. I can offer acknowledgement to these efforts and also say if something doesn't really sound right.
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чугунные тетради
Richard Gipps — Good old fashioned psychotherapy is SO MANY DIFFERENT THINGS. Some of the following overlap a little, but what interests me is making a list of *mutually irreducible therapeutic endeavours*. […] 1. Sometimes I'm 'just' a trustworthy recognition…
6. A patient will sometimes be caught up in an inner conflict of which he is, as we say, 'unaware', leaving him in touch only with anxiety and other symptoms. He needs to grow a more capacious mind which can tolerate the feelings, esp love AND hate, which haven't yet developed because of the anxiogenic clash. I can offer 'interpretations' which help clear the ground so that latent feelings may now become patent. Anxiety etc then settles.
7. A patient can self-regulate using harsh and demoralising, and hence backfiring, self-admonition. This is sustained by, and in turn sustains, a sense of self as unlovable. The habit and effects of this need noting; alternatives are to be developed; a joint stand can now be taken against this rather noxious 'superego'.
8. Containing projections. A patient, unable to tolerate her guilt or shame or sense of hopelessness or overwhelm, acts out in such a way as to fill me with these feelings. My job is to withstand and understand them, and over time help her become able to know and tolerate them.
9. Reality testing. When anxious, my patient struggles to know well the difference between realities and fears. Fantasy becomes too real. At just that point when he needs to grow by discovering he can face reality, a reality which is less insurmountable than he fears, he instead gets overwhelmed. But he can borrow both my confidence and my capacity to reality test, and over time take this away with him.
10. A patient will sometimes show an intolerance of her conscious feelings. This leads her to flail around, trying to suppress or remove or flee from the feelings. But, well, this doesn't work. I however can help her stay with her feelings, show her ordinary understanding, and allow them to pass in their own time.
11. The self sometimes over-organises itself around an unhelpfully narrow narrative array, and correlatively attends to the world in a hope-less, demoralised mode. This is a problem because we are self-interpreting animals: who we think we are affects who we are. I might now hope to highlight what the narrative therapists (for some reason) call 'unique outcomes', i.e. help augment the minor, more hopeful, themes.
7. A patient can self-regulate using harsh and demoralising, and hence backfiring, self-admonition. This is sustained by, and in turn sustains, a sense of self as unlovable. The habit and effects of this need noting; alternatives are to be developed; a joint stand can now be taken against this rather noxious 'superego'.
8. Containing projections. A patient, unable to tolerate her guilt or shame or sense of hopelessness or overwhelm, acts out in such a way as to fill me with these feelings. My job is to withstand and understand them, and over time help her become able to know and tolerate them.
9. Reality testing. When anxious, my patient struggles to know well the difference between realities and fears. Fantasy becomes too real. At just that point when he needs to grow by discovering he can face reality, a reality which is less insurmountable than he fears, he instead gets overwhelmed. But he can borrow both my confidence and my capacity to reality test, and over time take this away with him.
10. A patient will sometimes show an intolerance of her conscious feelings. This leads her to flail around, trying to suppress or remove or flee from the feelings. But, well, this doesn't work. I however can help her stay with her feelings, show her ordinary understanding, and allow them to pass in their own time.
11. The self sometimes over-organises itself around an unhelpfully narrow narrative array, and correlatively attends to the world in a hope-less, demoralised mode. This is a problem because we are self-interpreting animals: who we think we are affects who we are. I might now hope to highlight what the narrative therapists (for some reason) call 'unique outcomes', i.e. help augment the minor, more hopeful, themes.
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чугунные тетради
Robert Kegan. In Over Our Heads — «[…] given individual may over time come to organize her experience according to a higher order principle suggests that what we take as subject and what we take as object are not necessarily fixed for us. They are not permanent.…
Robert Kegan. In Over Our Heads
—
«Does William meet the claim upon him (and upon every one of us) to be aware of the way his personal history inclines or directs him? […]
Many therapists have found themselves puzzled about why clients differ so in their ability to "make productive use" of the insights psychotherapy can generate. In the face of their perfectly accurate assessment that two different clients are each "capable of insight," why should it be, they wonder, that for one person it leads to a real change of whatever magnitude in the way they construct their experience (an accommodation, Piaget might have called it, of their meaning-making system to the insight), while for the other the present system of meaning-making is unchanged or even fortified by the insight (an assimilation of the insight to the present system)?
William might, for example, make the powerful connection we describe [his childhood’s history] and yet continue to hold Betty responsible for the painful feelings her need for bedrest evokes in him! And he would see it in just that way: Her needs and behaviors create in him painful feelings. He would know better why they do but would continue to construct that they do as her responsibility. As I have been intrigued and dismayed to discover in my own therapy practice, he might even hold her more responsible when he has come to the insight in the context of couples therapy: "You were here listening to all this. You have heard what I went through as a kid, and you know now how difficult this would be for me, yet you still have these periods when you must take to your bed."
William's third order consciousness makes it possible for him to discover patterns and themes to his life history, make connections between past and present, and have insight into why he feels as he does. But his lack of a fourth order consciousness makes it impossible for him to "do something productive" with the insight, just as it is one thing to have an inner psychological life one can experience and report as internal (a third order capacity) and quite another to see oneself as the constructor of that inner psychological life. If one's inner experiences just "show up" there, so that the self-conscious self is an audience for its inner experiencing, then insight turns out to be insight into why the audience reacts as intensely to the content as it does, rather than into why or how the author writes the noscript or drama as he does.
The requirement that we “be aware of ‘our issues,’” as it is popularly expressed, that we be aware of the way our personal history inclines or directs us, is actually an expectation to do something more. It is a claim that we be able to see the way our personal history tends to filter our reading of experience so that we do not hold others responsible for the way we feel in response to their actions or choices.»
—
«Does William meet the claim upon him (and upon every one of us) to be aware of the way his personal history inclines or directs him? […]
Many therapists have found themselves puzzled about why clients differ so in their ability to "make productive use" of the insights psychotherapy can generate. In the face of their perfectly accurate assessment that two different clients are each "capable of insight," why should it be, they wonder, that for one person it leads to a real change of whatever magnitude in the way they construct their experience (an accommodation, Piaget might have called it, of their meaning-making system to the insight), while for the other the present system of meaning-making is unchanged or even fortified by the insight (an assimilation of the insight to the present system)?
William might, for example, make the powerful connection we describe [his childhood’s history] and yet continue to hold Betty responsible for the painful feelings her need for bedrest evokes in him! And he would see it in just that way: Her needs and behaviors create in him painful feelings. He would know better why they do but would continue to construct that they do as her responsibility. As I have been intrigued and dismayed to discover in my own therapy practice, he might even hold her more responsible when he has come to the insight in the context of couples therapy: "You were here listening to all this. You have heard what I went through as a kid, and you know now how difficult this would be for me, yet you still have these periods when you must take to your bed."
William's third order consciousness makes it possible for him to discover patterns and themes to his life history, make connections between past and present, and have insight into why he feels as he does. But his lack of a fourth order consciousness makes it impossible for him to "do something productive" with the insight, just as it is one thing to have an inner psychological life one can experience and report as internal (a third order capacity) and quite another to see oneself as the constructor of that inner psychological life. If one's inner experiences just "show up" there, so that the self-conscious self is an audience for its inner experiencing, then insight turns out to be insight into why the audience reacts as intensely to the content as it does, rather than into why or how the author writes the noscript or drama as he does.
The requirement that we “be aware of ‘our issues,’” as it is popularly expressed, that we be aware of the way our personal history inclines or directs us, is actually an expectation to do something more. It is a claim that we be able to see the way our personal history tends to filter our reading of experience so that we do not hold others responsible for the way we feel in response to their actions or choices.»
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Eugene Gendlin (1966). Existentialism and experiential psychotherapy.
—
«Existentialism is phenomenological; that means it aims to explicate directly what we concretely are, live and experience. Often, very abstruse constructs are coined, and these make existentialism seem like any other abstract conceptual-assumption system. Existentialists struggle to emphasize that they do not impose or assume their schemes to be in experience as such. Everything we say, both in theory and in personal self-expression, is a "lifting out," a "making be" of order, meaning, pattern, and situation, a "surpassing" in the very process of concrete living and doing, speaking, and thinking.
Thus they use words like "preontological" (that is to say, before ontology or philosophy is formulated), "prereflective" (before one reflects upon it and fashions a content that is reflected on), "preobjective" (before given objects are precisioned out, fashioned as objects) to convey the concrete flow of sentient living. All philosophic assertions are an explicating, a precisioning, "based on" the concrete ongoing living and feeling process.
Yet, this seemingly complicated way of describing concrete experience can be misleading. Many readers of existentialism do not realize the simple, obvious, concrete reference to their own "gut sentience," which these technical phrases attempt. Then it seems that existentialism is simply vague, "ambiguous," and one is invited to glorify the ephemeral as something described only by negative phrases (like God's negative attributes): It cannot be reduced to analysis; it cannot be reduced to words; it cannot be presented as lawful; it cannot be predicted; it is ever new, unique, unexpected, irreducible and hence incapable of being thought about clearly. This is an error. What is intended is the directly experienced, felt sentience which you are all the time, and out of which you live and look through your eyes. Nothing is more ordinary and known to you than your concrete sentient "being here"—in its "preontological," "predefined" concreteness. Only from out of it do you genuinely express yourself or genuinely make the specific contents and patterns, emotions and chains of explication, experiential steps and reactions that you find as you explicate phenomenologically (and these are always about the world, others, situations, what you want, fear, might do, hoped to avoid, and are affected by). Thus the crux of existentialism is this formula that humans exist without defined essence. Humans have as their being just their existence (ancient philosophic words for that alive felt sentience you are).»
—
«Existentialism is phenomenological; that means it aims to explicate directly what we concretely are, live and experience. Often, very abstruse constructs are coined, and these make existentialism seem like any other abstract conceptual-assumption system. Existentialists struggle to emphasize that they do not impose or assume their schemes to be in experience as such. Everything we say, both in theory and in personal self-expression, is a "lifting out," a "making be" of order, meaning, pattern, and situation, a "surpassing" in the very process of concrete living and doing, speaking, and thinking.
Thus they use words like "preontological" (that is to say, before ontology or philosophy is formulated), "prereflective" (before one reflects upon it and fashions a content that is reflected on), "preobjective" (before given objects are precisioned out, fashioned as objects) to convey the concrete flow of sentient living. All philosophic assertions are an explicating, a precisioning, "based on" the concrete ongoing living and feeling process.
Yet, this seemingly complicated way of describing concrete experience can be misleading. Many readers of existentialism do not realize the simple, obvious, concrete reference to their own "gut sentience," which these technical phrases attempt. Then it seems that existentialism is simply vague, "ambiguous," and one is invited to glorify the ephemeral as something described only by negative phrases (like God's negative attributes): It cannot be reduced to analysis; it cannot be reduced to words; it cannot be presented as lawful; it cannot be predicted; it is ever new, unique, unexpected, irreducible and hence incapable of being thought about clearly. This is an error. What is intended is the directly experienced, felt sentience which you are all the time, and out of which you live and look through your eyes. Nothing is more ordinary and known to you than your concrete sentient "being here"—in its "preontological," "predefined" concreteness. Only from out of it do you genuinely express yourself or genuinely make the specific contents and patterns, emotions and chains of explication, experiential steps and reactions that you find as you explicate phenomenologically (and these are always about the world, others, situations, what you want, fear, might do, hoped to avoid, and are affected by). Thus the crux of existentialism is this formula that humans exist without defined essence. Humans have as their being just their existence (ancient philosophic words for that alive felt sentience you are).»
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другими словами: давно собирался что-то написать про бордерлайн, к тому же начитался Stanghellini, которого многократно тут упоминал, и других итальянских феномено-патологов, и кажется, может интересно получится. Но как всегда слишком много всего хочется сказать, поэтому все затягивается. И, может быть, посты в телеграме это вообще не мой формат, надо сразу писать гигантского объема лонгриды, непонятно только, кто все будет читать
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Forwarded from железноголовый
> эмпатия второго порядка
Если у меня горе, мне тяжело и больно, и я хочу разделить свое горе с другим человеком, мне бы не хотелось чтобы он переживал то же самое, что переживаю я. Я бы хотел, чтобы он отнесся ко мне с *сочувствием*, то есть испытывал какие-то свои, другие, чувства по поводу моих чувств, но может быть в том же регистре. Не злорадство, не веселье, но грусть от того, что мне тяжело.
Если у меня радость, мне бы хотелось разделить это с другим человеком так, чтобы он по возможности испытал такую же радость. Если я влюблен, то я надеюсь что тот, в кого я влюблен переживает то же, что и я. В горе я хотел бы *сочувствия*, в радости — *сопереживания*.
Эмпатия это способность интуитивно улавливать чувства и состояния другого человека. Есть два вида эмпатических неудач: слишком далеко — не улавливаю, пропускаю, не понимаю, что человек чувствует, чувствую вообще что-то другое; слишком близко — сливаюсь, впадаю в чужие состояния, или наоборот, тороплюсь с пониманием, подменяю чувства другого своими.
Иногда не вполне понятно что я чувствую, или что чувствует другой. Эмпатия второго порядка, это позиция “не вполне понимаю, но хочу понять”, тогда совпадения, пересечения моих чувств и состояний с чувствами и состояниями другого человека, но не менее важны и различия между нами.
Чтобы понять, надо каким-то образом вчувствоваться. Для этого можно вписать состояние человека в более широкий контекст: кто это, где он, в каких обстоятельствах он находится. Кроме того, у нас есть “понимающая психология” (это не особо популярное название) как способ описания даже самых диковинных состояний. *Как* состояния переживаются, *почему* (в психологическом смысле) они возникают, а иногда даже и *зачем*. Из того что мне интересно, у нас есть психоаналитические описания, которые в большей степени фокусируются на том *почему* и *зачем* состояния возникают и длятся, и есть “феноменологическая психопатология” — больше о том, *как* что-то переживается.
Феноменологические описания опыта или “жизненного мира” затрагивают, в том числе, изменения конфигурации мирообразующих структур (категорий, экзистенциалов), то есть основ человеческого опыта: времени, пространства, телесности и др. Это, во-первых, само по себе увлекательно, и при некоторой сноровке оказывает психоделическое на меня воздействие, во-вторых, и правда позволяет лучше понимать происходящее с другими людьми. Описания эти часто шатаются от занудного академизма к поэтичности и обратно, что мне, например, мешает. Хотелось бы чего-то более ровного, не слишком занудного, и с упором на психодел. Поэтому решил сам собрать такое феноменологическое описание пограничного расстройства. Посмотрим, что получится.
—
https://ironhead.id/tlgrm-967
Если у меня горе, мне тяжело и больно, и я хочу разделить свое горе с другим человеком, мне бы не хотелось чтобы он переживал то же самое, что переживаю я. Я бы хотел, чтобы он отнесся ко мне с *сочувствием*, то есть испытывал какие-то свои, другие, чувства по поводу моих чувств, но может быть в том же регистре. Не злорадство, не веселье, но грусть от того, что мне тяжело.
Если у меня радость, мне бы хотелось разделить это с другим человеком так, чтобы он по возможности испытал такую же радость. Если я влюблен, то я надеюсь что тот, в кого я влюблен переживает то же, что и я. В горе я хотел бы *сочувствия*, в радости — *сопереживания*.
Эмпатия это способность интуитивно улавливать чувства и состояния другого человека. Есть два вида эмпатических неудач: слишком далеко — не улавливаю, пропускаю, не понимаю, что человек чувствует, чувствую вообще что-то другое; слишком близко — сливаюсь, впадаю в чужие состояния, или наоборот, тороплюсь с пониманием, подменяю чувства другого своими.
Иногда не вполне понятно что я чувствую, или что чувствует другой. Эмпатия второго порядка, это позиция “не вполне понимаю, но хочу понять”, тогда совпадения, пересечения моих чувств и состояний с чувствами и состояниями другого человека, но не менее важны и различия между нами.
Чтобы понять, надо каким-то образом вчувствоваться. Для этого можно вписать состояние человека в более широкий контекст: кто это, где он, в каких обстоятельствах он находится. Кроме того, у нас есть “понимающая психология” (это не особо популярное название) как способ описания даже самых диковинных состояний. *Как* состояния переживаются, *почему* (в психологическом смысле) они возникают, а иногда даже и *зачем*. Из того что мне интересно, у нас есть психоаналитические описания, которые в большей степени фокусируются на том *почему* и *зачем* состояния возникают и длятся, и есть “феноменологическая психопатология” — больше о том, *как* что-то переживается.
Феноменологические описания опыта или “жизненного мира” затрагивают, в том числе, изменения конфигурации мирообразующих структур (категорий, экзистенциалов), то есть основ человеческого опыта: времени, пространства, телесности и др. Это, во-первых, само по себе увлекательно, и при некоторой сноровке оказывает психоделическое на меня воздействие, во-вторых, и правда позволяет лучше понимать происходящее с другими людьми. Описания эти часто шатаются от занудного академизма к поэтичности и обратно, что мне, например, мешает. Хотелось бы чего-то более ровного, не слишком занудного, и с упором на психодел. Поэтому решил сам собрать такое феноменологическое описание пограничного расстройства. Посмотрим, что получится.
—
https://ironhead.id/tlgrm-967
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написал еще кусочек про пограничность, надеюсь это был последний вступительный, и дальше будет по делу
https://news.1rj.ru/str/ironheaded/968
https://news.1rj.ru/str/ironheaded/968
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железноголовый
> эмпатия второго порядка (2)
Люди бывают разные, и для упорядочивания этого многообразия созданы классификации типов. На пересечении психиатрической и психонаналитической типологий более-менее устоялся список из десятка типов личности. Но кроме типов, есть…
Люди бывают разные, и для упорядочивания этого многообразия созданы классификации типов. На пересечении психиатрической и психонаналитической типологий более-менее устоялся список из десятка типов личности. Но кроме типов, есть…
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