чугунные тетради
Другие создают субъекта из младенческого материала (который вообще-то чистой доской, конечно, не является, но в смысле субъектной идентификации это чистая доска), навязывая ему язык, культуру, идентификации, нарратив о самом себе, социальные отношения, орудия и знаки и многое другое.
Читаю теперь Kenneth Kaye. The Mental and Social Life of Babies, который говорит так: “The kinds of exchanges with adults that facilitate sensorimotor and later linguistic development require little from the infant at first except regularities in behavior and expressive reactions that parents tend to interpret as if they were meaningful gestures.”
То есть, буквально взращивающие интерпретации взращивают:
«…parents treat the child as more mature and more of a partner than he really is. Admittedly, there are real cues from the child that show he understands more than he did last week or last month. But the higher forms of interaction into which the adults slip are inevitably more advanced than what the child is actually capable of at the time. Thus parents are constantly drawing the child forward into a more challenging apprenticeship, eventually into a full partnership.»
То есть, буквально взращивающие интерпретации взращивают:
“Second period, beginning around 2 months (each period overlaps the prior one), is that of shared intentions. Again the sharing begins as a unilateral responsibility. Adults guess at the intentions underlying the infant's activity. In doing so, they nearly always go beyond the literal meaning of the infant's goal-directed act. Mothers and fathers attribute to the infant more specific intentionality, more elaborated plans, more accurate memory, more subtlety of affect than can ever be demonstrated objectively.”
“…until recently we have missed the importance of the way parents take over these indices of intention and interpret them as if they were messages.
The "he says" phenomenon is the purest illustration of this interpretive process. Before their infant is born, parents often tell each other what "he says." As they feel his intrauterine movements, one parent translates their meaning:
"He says," explains the parent, " 'No more beans, please!' "
"She says" (if their fantasy is a girl), " 'Let me out of here!' "
After the baby is born, one parent says to the other:
"She says, 'I'm hungry. Mom.' "
"He says, 'I'm sleepy Daddy, don't bounce me so much.' "
Indices of physiological state—hunger and pain cries, or the restless movements associated with fatigue—are interpreted as if they were signs of intention to do something about the state—to eat, to escape, to sleep—or requests to the parent to do something about it.
[…] What the parents are doing is integrating the new child into their already existing social system.”
«…parents treat the child as more mature and more of a partner than he really is. Admittedly, there are real cues from the child that show he understands more than he did last week or last month. But the higher forms of interaction into which the adults slip are inevitably more advanced than what the child is actually capable of at the time. Thus parents are constantly drawing the child forward into a more challenging apprenticeship, eventually into a full partnership.»
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David R. Loy. Nonduality: In Buddhism and Beyond
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«Śūnyata is perhaps the most important term in Mahāyāna, but it is not easy to translate. It comes from the root śū, which means “to swell” in two senses: hollow or empty, and also full, like the womb of a pregnant woman. Both are implied in the Mahāyāna usage: the first denies any fixed self-nature to anything, the second implies that this is also fullness and limitless possibility, for lack of any fixed characteristics allows the infinite diversity of impermanent phenomena. It has been unfortunate for Anglo-American Buddhist studies that “emptiness” captures only the first sense, but I follow the tradition.
The term is used in both Pāli and Mahāyāna Buddhism, but differently. Śūṇyatā in Pāli Buddhism generally means, first, that this world of saṁsāra is empty of value and should be negated in favor of nirvana; and second, that both saṁsāra and nirvana are empty of any self because all compounds are only clusters of dharma-elements. In Mahāyāna, śūnyatā means that the true nature of the world (tathatā) is empty of all denoscription and predication; and that even all the dharma-elements are empty of any self-existence because all “things” are relative and conditioned by each other.
[…]
…the equanimity of the Bodhisattva is due to his seeing all dharmas (including percepts) as śūnya, without any reality of their own and referring to nothing else besides themselves. That is the experience of tathatā, the “suchness” of things.»
—
«Śūnyata is perhaps the most important term in Mahāyāna, but it is not easy to translate. It comes from the root śū, which means “to swell” in two senses: hollow or empty, and also full, like the womb of a pregnant woman. Both are implied in the Mahāyāna usage: the first denies any fixed self-nature to anything, the second implies that this is also fullness and limitless possibility, for lack of any fixed characteristics allows the infinite diversity of impermanent phenomena. It has been unfortunate for Anglo-American Buddhist studies that “emptiness” captures only the first sense, but I follow the tradition.
The term is used in both Pāli and Mahāyāna Buddhism, but differently. Śūṇyatā in Pāli Buddhism generally means, first, that this world of saṁsāra is empty of value and should be negated in favor of nirvana; and second, that both saṁsāra and nirvana are empty of any self because all compounds are only clusters of dharma-elements. In Mahāyāna, śūnyatā means that the true nature of the world (tathatā) is empty of all denoscription and predication; and that even all the dharma-elements are empty of any self-existence because all “things” are relative and conditioned by each other.
[…]
…the equanimity of the Bodhisattva is due to his seeing all dharmas (including percepts) as śūnya, without any reality of their own and referring to nothing else besides themselves. That is the experience of tathatā, the “suchness” of things.»
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Paul L. Wachtel. Therapeutic Communication: Knowing What to Say When
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«One of the situations in which finding and building on whatever assets the patient has is most challenging—but also most important—occurs when the patient claims not to be feeling anything at all. One is confronted with such a state of affairs most often with obsessional and schizoid patients, and not infrequently the patient’s report of no feelings is conveyed with a tone of considerable discouragement and even despair.
An approach to this situation that I have found useful is to say to the patient something like I think that you have some idea of what you should be feeling, and because you’re not feeling that, you register it as not feeling anything.
Then, depending on the exact nature of the case (that is, depending on just what I did think the patient was experiencing), I might say something like Indifference is a feeling too. It’s not that you’re not feeling anything. You’re feeling indifference. In fact, you’re feeling a **great deal** of indifference.
Several patients have reported that this emphasis on there being something that they are feeling (albeit not what they think they are supposed to be feeling) has enabled them to avoid the discouragement and the battles that had occurred in previous therapies, where they felt the therapist was criticizing them for holding back or that he was telling them that they were less than human. (One patient said he felt “like a reptile, cold-blooded and scaly,” when his former therapist kept hammering away at how he ran from his feelings. “I didn’t know what to do, how to satisfy him. I just kept feeling more and more inadequate, unworthy, inhuman.”)»
—
«One of the situations in which finding and building on whatever assets the patient has is most challenging—but also most important—occurs when the patient claims not to be feeling anything at all. One is confronted with such a state of affairs most often with obsessional and schizoid patients, and not infrequently the patient’s report of no feelings is conveyed with a tone of considerable discouragement and even despair.
An approach to this situation that I have found useful is to say to the patient something like I think that you have some idea of what you should be feeling, and because you’re not feeling that, you register it as not feeling anything.
Then, depending on the exact nature of the case (that is, depending on just what I did think the patient was experiencing), I might say something like Indifference is a feeling too. It’s not that you’re not feeling anything. You’re feeling indifference. In fact, you’re feeling a **great deal** of indifference.
Several patients have reported that this emphasis on there being something that they are feeling (albeit not what they think they are supposed to be feeling) has enabled them to avoid the discouragement and the battles that had occurred in previous therapies, where they felt the therapist was criticizing them for holding back or that he was telling them that they were less than human. (One patient said he felt “like a reptile, cold-blooded and scaly,” when his former therapist kept hammering away at how he ran from his feelings. “I didn’t know what to do, how to satisfy him. I just kept feeling more and more inadequate, unworthy, inhuman.”)»
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Thomas Fuchs. Ecology of the Brain: The phenomenology and biology of the embodied mind
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«1. According to the enactive approach, living beings generally do not passively receive information from their environment which they then translate into internal representations. Rather, they constitute or enact their world through a process of sense-making (Varela et al. 1991, Thompson 2007, Di Paolo 2009): by actively searching and probing the environment for relevant cues—moving their head and eyes, touching a surface, walking towards a goal, grasping a fruit, etc.—they make sense of their surroundings. In other words, they constitute their experienced world or Umwelt (von Uexküll 1920) through their ongoing sensorimotor interaction and embodied coping with the environment.
2. In addition, through their social interactions and implicit relation to others, human beings are able to transcend their primary perspective and gain access to a shared, objective reality. From early childhood on, experiences of joint attention, pointing towards objects, shared reference to situations, mutual understanding, and cooperative practice result in a participatory sense-making (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007). In this way, a shared reality is constituted, which becomes an implicit part of our relation to the world. This is why we perceive a given experiential object as transcending its momentary appearance: it could also be seen by others. The objects are not only there “for me”: even Robinson Crusoe on his island always perceived his surroundings “with others’ eyes,” already before Friday appeared on the scene. This is also what enables us to see things as such, objectively, or in independence from our momentary perception. For objectivity ultimately indicates that the objects are experienced as intersubjectively accessible, in the co-presence of possible other subjects, or “as actually there for everyone” (Husserl 1960, 91). Human reality is therefore always co-constituted or, as we might say, “interenacted.”»
—
«1. According to the enactive approach, living beings generally do not passively receive information from their environment which they then translate into internal representations. Rather, they constitute or enact their world through a process of sense-making (Varela et al. 1991, Thompson 2007, Di Paolo 2009): by actively searching and probing the environment for relevant cues—moving their head and eyes, touching a surface, walking towards a goal, grasping a fruit, etc.—they make sense of their surroundings. In other words, they constitute their experienced world or Umwelt (von Uexküll 1920) through their ongoing sensorimotor interaction and embodied coping with the environment.
2. In addition, through their social interactions and implicit relation to others, human beings are able to transcend their primary perspective and gain access to a shared, objective reality. From early childhood on, experiences of joint attention, pointing towards objects, shared reference to situations, mutual understanding, and cooperative practice result in a participatory sense-making (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007). In this way, a shared reality is constituted, which becomes an implicit part of our relation to the world. This is why we perceive a given experiential object as transcending its momentary appearance: it could also be seen by others. The objects are not only there “for me”: even Robinson Crusoe on his island always perceived his surroundings “with others’ eyes,” already before Friday appeared on the scene. This is also what enables us to see things as such, objectively, or in independence from our momentary perception. For objectivity ultimately indicates that the objects are experienced as intersubjectively accessible, in the co-presence of possible other subjects, or “as actually there for everyone” (Husserl 1960, 91). Human reality is therefore always co-constituted or, as we might say, “interenacted.”»
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# “у меня какие-то чувства, что делать, помогите!”
чувства все время случаются, и иногда превращаются в проблему, с которой хочется что-то сделать. Понятно, что чувства надо чувствовать, но иногда можно что-то и поделать. Что стоит делать, когда и как — сильно зависит от намерений и обстоятельств, но вот неполный список вариантов, что можно делать с самими чувствами, но не с ситуациями в которых они возникают.
I. ничего не делать, потому что делать нечего: никакой проблемы нет и не было никогда. Чувства просто сами расцветают, и сами выцветают и увядают, иногда что-то значат или нет, побуждают к чему-то или просто окрашивают происходящее, никакой проблемы нет ни внутри чувств, ни в том, на что они указывают. Что делать или не делать и так ясно: будет грустно — погрустим; смерть придет — помирать будем.
II. что-то, все таки, надо делать. (Эти способы что-то делать взаимосвязаны и перетекают друг в друга.)
1. не мешать чувствам самораспутываться. Не мешать — это все же какое-то действие, хоть и минимальное. Ничего специального не делать, не обдумывать, не накручивать, не впадать в них, но давать время и место, позволять происходить, не препятствовать их протеканию.
2. разворачивать, выражать и трансформировать
- физически: через тело и движение
- энергетически: через дыхание, визуализацю
- символически: художественными средствами и посредством ритуала
- концептуально: через слова, понимание, и трактование смысла (как в разговорной терапии)
3. подавлять, пресекать и отбрасывать
- ментально: удерживать фокус, концентрироваться на чем-то другом
- физически: гасить импульс бездействием, намеренно не делать то, к чему побуждают чувства (возможно, делать что-то другое)
чувства все время случаются, и иногда превращаются в проблему, с которой хочется что-то сделать. Понятно, что чувства надо чувствовать, но иногда можно что-то и поделать. Что стоит делать, когда и как — сильно зависит от намерений и обстоятельств, но вот неполный список вариантов, что можно делать с самими чувствами, но не с ситуациями в которых они возникают.
I. ничего не делать, потому что делать нечего: никакой проблемы нет и не было никогда. Чувства просто сами расцветают, и сами выцветают и увядают, иногда что-то значат или нет, побуждают к чему-то или просто окрашивают происходящее, никакой проблемы нет ни внутри чувств, ни в том, на что они указывают. Что делать или не делать и так ясно: будет грустно — погрустим; смерть придет — помирать будем.
II. что-то, все таки, надо делать. (Эти способы что-то делать взаимосвязаны и перетекают друг в друга.)
1. не мешать чувствам самораспутываться. Не мешать — это все же какое-то действие, хоть и минимальное. Ничего специального не делать, не обдумывать, не накручивать, не впадать в них, но давать время и место, позволять происходить, не препятствовать их протеканию.
2. разворачивать, выражать и трансформировать
- физически: через тело и движение
- энергетически: через дыхание, визуализацю
- символически: художественными средствами и посредством ритуала
- концептуально: через слова, понимание, и трактование смысла (как в разговорной терапии)
3. подавлять, пресекать и отбрасывать
- ментально: удерживать фокус, концентрироваться на чем-то другом
- физически: гасить импульс бездействием, намеренно не делать то, к чему побуждают чувства (возможно, делать что-то другое)
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Esther Perel. Mating in Captivity
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«Love enjoys knowing everything about you; desire needs mystery. Love likes to shrink the distance that exists between me and you, while desire is energized by it. If intimacy grows through repetition and familiarity, eroticism is numbed by repetition. It thrives on the mysterious, the novel, and the unexpected. Love is about having; desire is about wanting. An expression of longing, desire requires ongoing elusiveness. It is less concerned with where it has already been than passionate about where it can still go. But too often, as couples settle into the comforts of love, they cease to fan the flame of desire. They forget that fire needs air.»
—
«Love enjoys knowing everything about you; desire needs mystery. Love likes to shrink the distance that exists between me and you, while desire is energized by it. If intimacy grows through repetition and familiarity, eroticism is numbed by repetition. It thrives on the mysterious, the novel, and the unexpected. Love is about having; desire is about wanting. An expression of longing, desire requires ongoing elusiveness. It is less concerned with where it has already been than passionate about where it can still go. But too often, as couples settle into the comforts of love, they cease to fan the flame of desire. They forget that fire needs air.»
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Thomas Fuchs. What is phenomenology [The Significance of Phenomenology Today]
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«…the significance of phenomenology today lies not only in being a science of consciousness. Rather, it is the phenomenology of the prereflective, lived body, of our embodied and extended subjectivity that is able to challenge current mainstream paradigms in cognitive neuroscience, social cognition and also in psychiatry.
I have chosen schizophrenia as the paradigm case for an extended and ecological concept of mental disorders. But it may still serve another purpose: The disembodied, detached experience of schizophrenic patients resembles in many respects the disembodied, representationalist concepts of mainstream cognitive science and mainstream social cognition. Let me remind you of Thomas Metzinger’s quotation: «First, our brains generate a world simulation, so perfect that we do not recognize it as an image in our minds. Then, they generate an inner image of ourselves as a whole (…) We are not in direct contact with outside reality or with ourselves (…) We live our conscious lives in the Ego Tunnel.»
Somewhat pointedly, one could say: If we were all schizophrenic, then Thomas Metzinger would be right. We would then feel a split between ourselves and our body which we would have to steer from the outside like a Cartesian Ego. We would not inhabit the world through the medium of our body but we would feel distant to the world, not really present, like on a foreign planet. And (if Metzinger were right) we would not empathically understand others but would have to theorize about them in order to make sense of their puzzling behaviour. We would indeed live our lives the Ego Tunnel.
This is fortunately not the case. Fortunately, we are no movies produced by a brain but we are embodied living beings; fortunately, we do not live in a Matrix world in our heads but in a life-world that we share with one another. The significance of phenomenology today may be seen in helping us to recognize our human condition again and to understand it in a new and deeper way.»
—
«…the significance of phenomenology today lies not only in being a science of consciousness. Rather, it is the phenomenology of the prereflective, lived body, of our embodied and extended subjectivity that is able to challenge current mainstream paradigms in cognitive neuroscience, social cognition and also in psychiatry.
I have chosen schizophrenia as the paradigm case for an extended and ecological concept of mental disorders. But it may still serve another purpose: The disembodied, detached experience of schizophrenic patients resembles in many respects the disembodied, representationalist concepts of mainstream cognitive science and mainstream social cognition. Let me remind you of Thomas Metzinger’s quotation: «First, our brains generate a world simulation, so perfect that we do not recognize it as an image in our minds. Then, they generate an inner image of ourselves as a whole (…) We are not in direct contact with outside reality or with ourselves (…) We live our conscious lives in the Ego Tunnel.»
Somewhat pointedly, one could say: If we were all schizophrenic, then Thomas Metzinger would be right. We would then feel a split between ourselves and our body which we would have to steer from the outside like a Cartesian Ego. We would not inhabit the world through the medium of our body but we would feel distant to the world, not really present, like on a foreign planet. And (if Metzinger were right) we would not empathically understand others but would have to theorize about them in order to make sense of their puzzling behaviour. We would indeed live our lives the Ego Tunnel.
This is fortunately not the case. Fortunately, we are no movies produced by a brain but we are embodied living beings; fortunately, we do not live in a Matrix world in our heads but in a life-world that we share with one another. The significance of phenomenology today may be seen in helping us to recognize our human condition again and to understand it in a new and deeper way.»
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