я это услышал впервые, страшно подумать, 30 лет назад, и оказалось что так тоже можно. Наверное с тех пор все так

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NxcOxvEsE_Y

и вот еще, пока на гребне бумерской волны, любимое

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D9Cg_f95wik&list=PLEMzLROuENR0zKj_1g-A9baVSGUNfHh-A&index=2

good stuff

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SaSZdCauekg

Kristopher Nielsen. Embodied, Embedded, and Enactive Psychopathology
—

«One of the biggest mysteries in philosophy is how purpose, meaning, and a sense that some states of the world are better or worse than others (e.g., normativity), can arise in a world of objects and facts. The answer to this mystery, according to enactivism, is that these things are brought forth—or rather enacted—through the recursive structures of life forms and their relationship to the world—i.e., the universe has meaning for life forms because of the way they are shaped to keep trying to live in an imperfect world. To unpack this, consider that all life must actively maintain a precarious organizational structure against the entropic flow of the universe around it, requiring the metabolism of energy from the environment to do so. To put this in simpler terms, life forms are really complicated and highly organized, while the surrounding universe tends towards disorganization. All life forms therefore have to do a lot of work in order to keep themselves up and running. If they stop doing this work they will die and decompose back into their environment. In a sense then, all life is constantly creating and defining itself. To do such work requires energy, which has to be sourced from the surrounding environment (e.g., food and oxygen), and the ability to adapt to threats and environmental changes (e.g., temperature fluctuations and other life forms that want to eat you). In order to source energy and avoid threat, organisms must, in either a basic or more complex sense, make sense of the world in order to navigate and respond to changes in it adaptively. This effectively sets up a selective pressure. We can see then that having an embodied purpose to keep living sets up the emergence of meaning for the organism. For a given life form the world ultimately has meaning because some things help it survive and some things threaten its survival, and it will be of clear benefit to the survival of the organism to evolve and learn to make sense of the world in order to respond adaptively.

[…]

For now, suffice to recognize that there is a sense in which things can be good or bad for bacteria, trees, tigers, and people, in a way that things can’t be good or bad for a pile of rocks. This is because, essentially, it is easy for these life forms to die, and hard for them to keep living; they are precarious in that they are far-from-equilibrium systems situated in an entropic universe. The very process of staying alive, i.e., self-maintenance, necessitates the metabolism of energy which is sourced from the environment. At the cellular level this process of self-maintenance is referred to as autopoiesis; literally ‘self-creation’. For the enactivist, this precariousness and the needful relation it establishes between the organism and its environment is the root from which meaning develops.»

Kristopher Nielsen. Embodied, Embedded, and Enactive Psychopathology
—

«Traditionally the dualistic divide between the mental and the physical has dominated our language and thereby our understanding of how ‘mental’ disorders can relate to physical processes. For example, in Chap. 2 we saw how certain conceptual positions understand mental disorders to be ‘products’ of biological/neurological abnormalities (e.g., biological essentialists), while others understand mental disorders to exist at a ‘psychological level’, somehow independent from biology (e.g., cognitive essentialists). Ideas of emergence, constitution, and organizational causality are inherent within the central 3e notion of embodiment—that our psychological functioning *is* the action of our biology in context over time. If our psychological functioning is embodied, then psychological dysfunction, whatever that may mean, seems unlikely to fit neatly into psychological or biological categories. This fits with the empirical evidence that ‘mental disorders’ are messy sorts of things, with causal factors ‘dappled’ over the traditional ontological domains of genetics, neurobiology, physiology, environment, as so on (Kendler, 2012). In a sense we might say that mental disorders are *ontologically disrespectful* in that they run amok over such categories. Notions such as organizational causality, dynamical constitution, and embodiment, allow us to make sense of such ontologically disrespectful phenomena because they allow us to conceive of constitutionally complex phenomena and process structures existing across multiple traditional scales of enquiry.»

Thomas Fuchs. Ecology of the Brain: The phenomenology and biology of the embodied mind
—

«Neurobiology is primarily a highly specialized form of common practice arising from the lifeworld. “The lifeworld includes everything we can speak about in pre-scientific terms: fellow humans, cats, sunflowers, stones, weapons, cathedrals, but also sounds, afterimages, thoughts, memories, hunger, happiness and fear” (Hartmann 1998, 322; own translation). However, initially it does not contain any constructs such as atoms, molecules, or action potentials. Within the lifeworld, human beings form cultural, linguistic, and action communities, among them also special practice forms such as the natural sciences, which raise the perspective of the observer to its methodological ruling principle. In that way, they cut out certain quantifiable and objectifiable areas from the phenomenal lifeworld […]. In order to describe the structures of the section of reality they choose, they develop certain terminologies, and, in due course, certain constructs (atoms, electrons, waves, potentials, fields, etc.), which serve to explain the processes observed and which, in connection with certain laws, are of high prognostic, and thus also practical value for the community. In this way, methodical norms, such as the causal principle, which were initially only research directives, gain increasing undisputed, indeed metaphysical status (such as “universal determinism”).”

The “second naturalistic fallacy” consists, according to Hartmann, in the fact that the structures and processes postulated on the construct level are now increasingly pushed underneath the lifeworld experience and, in the long run, hypostasized as actual reality:

“A knife consists of a blade and a handle, the material of the blade is an alloy which consists of molecules which are a combination of atoms, which, in turn, consist of even more minute particles—all just a matter of looking “ever more closely.” It is overlooked here that the construct objects, in contrast to the objects on the phenomenal level, are not accessible independent of the theories in which they arise. (Hartmann 1998, 326)”

This gradual substitution of the phenomena by quantifiable constructs remains unproblematic for the primary, that is, inorganic and mechanical objects of the natural sciences. It already becomes, however, reductionist for the phenomena of life as these presuppose complex or holistically structured and, thus, macroscopic bodies; they disappear from sight in the course of ever progressing division. This approach must all the more remain reductionist in the face of the phenomena of experience and consciousness because these per se evade the objectifying perspective. According to the fallacy of the ontological hypostasizing of the constructs, physical denoscription shall now apply universally, that is, capture all conceivable aspects of reality. The lifeworld must thus be reconstructed from the constructs: a dog barking happily then consists of certain collections of organic molecules, and his barking can be explained from genetic programs. The performance of Mozart’s “Requiem” consists of transitory fluctuations in air pressure in the surroundings of human beings and the heard melody is explained from the firing of neurons in the brain of the listener.»

Paul L. Wachtel. Therapeutic Communication: Knowing What to Say When
—

«Poland provides a number of interesting illustrations of how language may be used, when the therapist or analyst is aware, to enhance the likelihood of getting through to the patient. One of my favorites involves an instance in which a patient presented to him a dream in which “the manifest content repudiates an urge, one the patient would prefer to disown.” In speaking about the dream, the patient adds that he “would never do anything so outrageous as the dream suggests.” To this Poland replied, “You wouldn’t even dream of such a thing” (1986, pp. 246–247).»

Габриэль фон Макс (1840–1915) «Ученые»
холст, масло

Ger Langeweg (1891 — 1970)

Культура диагнозов появилась как специфический антидот для специфического дистресса. Оказалось, к примеру, что диагностированное психическое расстройство превращает неприятную с точки зрения атрибуции ответственности «прокрастинацию» в респектабельный симптом СДВГ, а трудности с пониманием и учетом интересов окружающих людей могут быть предъявлены и оправданы как высокофункциональное РАС. Массовая культура, подхватив этот тренд, запустила что-то вроде программы «психоцентризм 2.0». В отличие от более ранней версии эта программа продвигает уже лозунги типа «исцели свои травмы» и «прими свои нейроотличия», которые по сути являются сциентистски оформленными и идеально вписанными в терапевтический этос обоснованиями неуспеха индивидуального неолиберального проекта собственной жизни.

Изящество этой формулы не очевидно на первый взгляд. Дело в том, что такие концепты и нарративы как «исцеление детских травм», или «бережное отношение к нейроотличиям» имеют, как новые доллары, дополнительные степени защиты.

Во-первых, они ограждены от внешней критики – неустойчивость и спорность диагностических категорий хорошо известна в профессиональном сообществе и остро критикуется, но при этом само научное сомнение воспринимается и объявляется интересантами как ретроградное и противоречащее прогрессивным идеям доказательной психиатрии. Это спокойно позволяет игнорировать аргументы противоположной стороны, не рассматривая их по существу. Во-вторых, концепция этих субъективно диагностируемых расстройств нефальсифицируема: например неуспех длительной психотерапии «детской травмы» трактуется как свидетельство особой ее тяжести, некурабельности. Альтернативная гипотеза, что, возможно, терапия была неэффективна из-за отсутствия субстрата, то есть собственно травмы в ее сугубо медицинском понимании, не принимается во внимание.

Подчеркнем, что как правило нет причин, чтобы этот процесс погружения человека в социальные практики самодиагностики и самоописания в психиатрических терминах рассматривать с точки зрения устаревших концепций «вторичной выгоды» или тем более симуляции. Индивид движется в дискурсивном поле диагностической культуры и в итоге конституирует себя как страдающего ментальным расстройством вполне искренне и самостоятельно.

Из статьи «Психиатрический диагноз как новая культура себя».

[рубрика “выдуманные цитаты”]

“The trouble is, I don’t like life that much — but there isn’t much else going on either.”

“It hurts so good, doesn’t it?”