чугунные тетради
Kristopher Nielsen. Embodied, Embedded, and Enactive Psychopathology — «One of the biggest mysteries in philosophy is how purpose, meaning, and a sense that some states of the world are better or worse than others (e.g., normativity), can arise in a world…
Kristopher Nielsen. Embodied, Embedded, and Enactive Psychopathology
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«Traditionally the dualistic divide between the mental and the physical has dominated our language and thereby our understanding of how ‘mental’ disorders can relate to physical processes. For example, in Chap. 2 we saw how certain conceptual positions understand mental disorders to be ‘products’ of biological/neurological abnormalities (e.g., biological essentialists), while others understand mental disorders to exist at a ‘psychological level’, somehow independent from biology (e.g., cognitive essentialists). Ideas of emergence, constitution, and organizational causality are inherent within the central 3e notion of embodiment—that our psychological functioning *is* the action of our biology in context over time. If our psychological functioning is embodied, then psychological dysfunction, whatever that may mean, seems unlikely to fit neatly into psychological or biological categories. This fits with the empirical evidence that ‘mental disorders’ are messy sorts of things, with causal factors ‘dappled’ over the traditional ontological domains of genetics, neurobiology, physiology, environment, as so on (Kendler, 2012). In a sense we might say that mental disorders are *ontologically disrespectful* in that they run amok over such categories. Notions such as organizational causality, dynamical constitution, and embodiment, allow us to make sense of such ontologically disrespectful phenomena because they allow us to conceive of constitutionally complex phenomena and process structures existing across multiple traditional scales of enquiry.»
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«Traditionally the dualistic divide between the mental and the physical has dominated our language and thereby our understanding of how ‘mental’ disorders can relate to physical processes. For example, in Chap. 2 we saw how certain conceptual positions understand mental disorders to be ‘products’ of biological/neurological abnormalities (e.g., biological essentialists), while others understand mental disorders to exist at a ‘psychological level’, somehow independent from biology (e.g., cognitive essentialists). Ideas of emergence, constitution, and organizational causality are inherent within the central 3e notion of embodiment—that our psychological functioning *is* the action of our biology in context over time. If our psychological functioning is embodied, then psychological dysfunction, whatever that may mean, seems unlikely to fit neatly into psychological or biological categories. This fits with the empirical evidence that ‘mental disorders’ are messy sorts of things, with causal factors ‘dappled’ over the traditional ontological domains of genetics, neurobiology, physiology, environment, as so on (Kendler, 2012). In a sense we might say that mental disorders are *ontologically disrespectful* in that they run amok over such categories. Notions such as organizational causality, dynamical constitution, and embodiment, allow us to make sense of such ontologically disrespectful phenomena because they allow us to conceive of constitutionally complex phenomena and process structures existing across multiple traditional scales of enquiry.»
чугунные тетради
Kristopher Nielsen. Embodied, Embedded, and Enactive Psychopathology — «Traditionally the dualistic divide between the mental and the physical has dominated our language and thereby our understanding of how ‘mental’ disorders can relate to physical processes.…
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Thomas Fuchs. Ecology of the Brain: The phenomenology and biology of the embodied mind
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«Neurobiology is primarily a highly specialized form of common practice arising from the lifeworld. “The lifeworld includes everything we can speak about in pre-scientific terms: fellow humans, cats, sunflowers, stones, weapons, cathedrals, but also sounds, afterimages, thoughts, memories, hunger, happiness and fear” (Hartmann 1998, 322; own translation). However, initially it does not contain any constructs such as atoms, molecules, or action potentials. Within the lifeworld, human beings form cultural, linguistic, and action communities, among them also special practice forms such as the natural sciences, which raise the perspective of the observer to its methodological ruling principle. In that way, they cut out certain quantifiable and objectifiable areas from the phenomenal lifeworld […]. In order to describe the structures of the section of reality they choose, they develop certain terminologies, and, in due course, certain constructs (atoms, electrons, waves, potentials, fields, etc.), which serve to explain the processes observed and which, in connection with certain laws, are of high prognostic, and thus also practical value for the community. In this way, methodical norms, such as the causal principle, which were initially only research directives, gain increasing undisputed, indeed metaphysical status (such as “universal determinism”).”
The “second naturalistic fallacy” consists, according to Hartmann, in the fact that the structures and processes postulated on the construct level are now increasingly pushed underneath the lifeworld experience and, in the long run, hypostasized as actual reality:
“A knife consists of a blade and a handle, the material of the blade is an alloy which consists of molecules which are a combination of atoms, which, in turn, consist of even more minute particles—all just a matter of looking “ever more closely.” It is overlooked here that the construct objects, in contrast to the objects on the phenomenal level, are not accessible independent of the theories in which they arise. (Hartmann 1998, 326)”
This gradual substitution of the phenomena by quantifiable constructs remains unproblematic for the primary, that is, inorganic and mechanical objects of the natural sciences. It already becomes, however, reductionist for the phenomena of life as these presuppose complex or holistically structured and, thus, macroscopic bodies; they disappear from sight in the course of ever progressing division. This approach must all the more remain reductionist in the face of the phenomena of experience and consciousness because these per se evade the objectifying perspective. According to the fallacy of the ontological hypostasizing of the constructs, physical denoscription shall now apply universally, that is, capture all conceivable aspects of reality. The lifeworld must thus be reconstructed from the constructs: a dog barking happily then consists of certain collections of organic molecules, and his barking can be explained from genetic programs. The performance of Mozart’s “Requiem” consists of transitory fluctuations in air pressure in the surroundings of human beings and the heard melody is explained from the firing of neurons in the brain of the listener.»
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«Neurobiology is primarily a highly specialized form of common practice arising from the lifeworld. “The lifeworld includes everything we can speak about in pre-scientific terms: fellow humans, cats, sunflowers, stones, weapons, cathedrals, but also sounds, afterimages, thoughts, memories, hunger, happiness and fear” (Hartmann 1998, 322; own translation). However, initially it does not contain any constructs such as atoms, molecules, or action potentials. Within the lifeworld, human beings form cultural, linguistic, and action communities, among them also special practice forms such as the natural sciences, which raise the perspective of the observer to its methodological ruling principle. In that way, they cut out certain quantifiable and objectifiable areas from the phenomenal lifeworld […]. In order to describe the structures of the section of reality they choose, they develop certain terminologies, and, in due course, certain constructs (atoms, electrons, waves, potentials, fields, etc.), which serve to explain the processes observed and which, in connection with certain laws, are of high prognostic, and thus also practical value for the community. In this way, methodical norms, such as the causal principle, which were initially only research directives, gain increasing undisputed, indeed metaphysical status (such as “universal determinism”).”
The “second naturalistic fallacy” consists, according to Hartmann, in the fact that the structures and processes postulated on the construct level are now increasingly pushed underneath the lifeworld experience and, in the long run, hypostasized as actual reality:
“A knife consists of a blade and a handle, the material of the blade is an alloy which consists of molecules which are a combination of atoms, which, in turn, consist of even more minute particles—all just a matter of looking “ever more closely.” It is overlooked here that the construct objects, in contrast to the objects on the phenomenal level, are not accessible independent of the theories in which they arise. (Hartmann 1998, 326)”
This gradual substitution of the phenomena by quantifiable constructs remains unproblematic for the primary, that is, inorganic and mechanical objects of the natural sciences. It already becomes, however, reductionist for the phenomena of life as these presuppose complex or holistically structured and, thus, macroscopic bodies; they disappear from sight in the course of ever progressing division. This approach must all the more remain reductionist in the face of the phenomena of experience and consciousness because these per se evade the objectifying perspective. According to the fallacy of the ontological hypostasizing of the constructs, physical denoscription shall now apply universally, that is, capture all conceivable aspects of reality. The lifeworld must thus be reconstructed from the constructs: a dog barking happily then consists of certain collections of organic molecules, and his barking can be explained from genetic programs. The performance of Mozart’s “Requiem” consists of transitory fluctuations in air pressure in the surroundings of human beings and the heard melody is explained from the firing of neurons in the brain of the listener.»
Paul L. Wachtel. Therapeutic Communication: Knowing What to Say When
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«Poland provides a number of interesting illustrations of how language may be used, when the therapist or analyst is aware, to enhance the likelihood of getting through to the patient. One of my favorites involves an instance in which a patient presented to him a dream in which “the manifest content repudiates an urge, one the patient would prefer to disown.” In speaking about the dream, the patient adds that he “would never do anything so outrageous as the dream suggests.” To this Poland replied, “You wouldn’t even dream of such a thing” (1986, pp. 246–247).»
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«Poland provides a number of interesting illustrations of how language may be used, when the therapist or analyst is aware, to enhance the likelihood of getting through to the patient. One of my favorites involves an instance in which a patient presented to him a dream in which “the manifest content repudiates an urge, one the patient would prefer to disown.” In speaking about the dream, the patient adds that he “would never do anything so outrageous as the dream suggests.” To this Poland replied, “You wouldn’t even dream of such a thing” (1986, pp. 246–247).»
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Forwarded from Состоявшиеся художники обсуждают хорошее искусство (Anton Semakin)
Габриэль фон Макс (1840–1915) «Ученые»
холст, масло
холст, масло
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Forwarded from Insolarance Cult
Культура диагнозов появилась как специфический антидот для специфического дистресса. Оказалось, к примеру, что диагностированное психическое расстройство превращает неприятную с точки зрения атрибуции ответственности «прокрастинацию» в респектабельный симптом СДВГ, а трудности с пониманием и учетом интересов окружающих людей могут быть предъявлены и оправданы как высокофункциональное РАС. Массовая культура, подхватив этот тренд, запустила что-то вроде программы «психоцентризм 2.0». В отличие от более ранней версии эта программа продвигает уже лозунги типа «исцели свои травмы» и «прими свои нейроотличия», которые по сути являются сциентистски оформленными и идеально вписанными в терапевтический этос обоснованиями неуспеха индивидуального неолиберального проекта собственной жизни.
Изящество этой формулы не очевидно на первый взгляд. Дело в том, что такие концепты и нарративы как «исцеление детских травм», или «бережное отношение к нейроотличиям» имеют, как новые доллары, дополнительные степени защиты.
Во-первых, они ограждены от внешней критики – неустойчивость и спорность диагностических категорий хорошо известна в профессиональном сообществе и остро критикуется, но при этом само научное сомнение воспринимается и объявляется интересантами как ретроградное и противоречащее прогрессивным идеям доказательной психиатрии. Это спокойно позволяет игнорировать аргументы противоположной стороны, не рассматривая их по существу. Во-вторых, концепция этих субъективно диагностируемых расстройств нефальсифицируема: например неуспех длительной психотерапии «детской травмы» трактуется как свидетельство особой ее тяжести, некурабельности. Альтернативная гипотеза, что, возможно, терапия была неэффективна из-за отсутствия субстрата, то есть собственно травмы в ее сугубо медицинском понимании, не принимается во внимание.
Подчеркнем, что как правило нет причин, чтобы этот процесс погружения человека в социальные практики самодиагностики и самоописания в психиатрических терминах рассматривать с точки зрения устаревших концепций «вторичной выгоды» или тем более симуляции. Индивид движется в дискурсивном поле диагностической культуры и в итоге конституирует себя как страдающего ментальным расстройством вполне искренне и самостоятельно.
Из статьи «Психиатрический диагноз как новая культура себя».
Изящество этой формулы не очевидно на первый взгляд. Дело в том, что такие концепты и нарративы как «исцеление детских травм», или «бережное отношение к нейроотличиям» имеют, как новые доллары, дополнительные степени защиты.
Во-первых, они ограждены от внешней критики – неустойчивость и спорность диагностических категорий хорошо известна в профессиональном сообществе и остро критикуется, но при этом само научное сомнение воспринимается и объявляется интересантами как ретроградное и противоречащее прогрессивным идеям доказательной психиатрии. Это спокойно позволяет игнорировать аргументы противоположной стороны, не рассматривая их по существу. Во-вторых, концепция этих субъективно диагностируемых расстройств нефальсифицируема: например неуспех длительной психотерапии «детской травмы» трактуется как свидетельство особой ее тяжести, некурабельности. Альтернативная гипотеза, что, возможно, терапия была неэффективна из-за отсутствия субстрата, то есть собственно травмы в ее сугубо медицинском понимании, не принимается во внимание.
Подчеркнем, что как правило нет причин, чтобы этот процесс погружения человека в социальные практики самодиагностики и самоописания в психиатрических терминах рассматривать с точки зрения устаревших концепций «вторичной выгоды» или тем более симуляции. Индивид движется в дискурсивном поле диагностической культуры и в итоге конституирует себя как страдающего ментальным расстройством вполне искренне и самостоятельно.
Из статьи «Психиатрический диагноз как новая культура себя».
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чугунные тетради
[рубрика “выдуманные цитаты”] “Вы что такое выдумываете-то? На такую феноменологию нам никакой герменевтики не хватит!”
[рубрика “выдуманные цитаты”]
“The trouble is, I don’t like life that much — but there isn’t much else going on either.”
“The trouble is, I don’t like life that much — but there isn’t much else going on either.”
чугунные тетради
[рубрика “выдуманные цитаты”] “The trouble is, I don’t like life that much — but there isn’t much else going on either.”
“It hurts so good, doesn’t it?”
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чугунные тетради
“It hurts so good, doesn’t it?”
[рубрика “выдуманные цитаты”]
“They used to call it a ‘father figure’ — now it’s just ‘dad bod’.”
“They used to call it a ‘father figure’ — now it’s just ‘dad bod’.”