• 사담
‘한국어 쓰기에 관하여’
전문가들의 이런 문장을 한 번 생각해본다.
<US Risk prob 50% 이상이라 생각하지만 Mild할 것이고, CB들의 Hike cycle이 Peak에 이르렀으며, market valuation이 프론트 러닝한 상태라 마켓플레이어들은 bottom-fishing에 더욱 rush 중, 숏 스퀴즈와 민리버팅 때문에 year laggard가 leading하는 market condition이 계속 될 것 같다. 물론 economic key indicator들이 nagative territory에서 계속 프레셔를 줄 것임.>
흠... 🤔
<경기침체 확률을 높게 보지만, 과거와 다른 깊은 침체는 아니며, 중앙은행들의 금리인상 주기가 막바지에 이르렀고, 시장에 대한 가치평가가 선행해서 바닥을 쳤음. 대부분의 시장 참여자들이 낙폭이 큰 주식들을 살피기 시작하며, 공매도 회수와 주가의 강한 평균회귀 성향 때문에 작년 한해 부진했던 주식들이 올해 상승을 주도함. 물론, 핵심 경제 지표들이 여전히 부정적 영역에 있단 사실이 부담으로 작용할 것임.>
한국어를 순화해서 사용하려는 노력을 하는 이유는, 가장 쉽고 원초적인 문장으로 내가 이해한 바를 설명할 수 있다면, 그것이 진정으로 내가 시장을 공부하고 내 것으로 만들고 있다고 생각하기 때문이다.
퀀트로 시작해 매크로 펀드까지 두루 다루며 얼마나 많은 용어와 영어와 업계 은어를 접하는지 생각해보면, 내가 흡수한 것을 발산할 때는, 적어도 하나의 의지, 바르고 고운 한국어로 해보잔 생각이 있다.
‘한국어 쓰기에 관하여’
전문가들의 이런 문장을 한 번 생각해본다.
<US Risk prob 50% 이상이라 생각하지만 Mild할 것이고, CB들의 Hike cycle이 Peak에 이르렀으며, market valuation이 프론트 러닝한 상태라 마켓플레이어들은 bottom-fishing에 더욱 rush 중, 숏 스퀴즈와 민리버팅 때문에 year laggard가 leading하는 market condition이 계속 될 것 같다. 물론 economic key indicator들이 nagative territory에서 계속 프레셔를 줄 것임.>
흠... 🤔
<경기침체 확률을 높게 보지만, 과거와 다른 깊은 침체는 아니며, 중앙은행들의 금리인상 주기가 막바지에 이르렀고, 시장에 대한 가치평가가 선행해서 바닥을 쳤음. 대부분의 시장 참여자들이 낙폭이 큰 주식들을 살피기 시작하며, 공매도 회수와 주가의 강한 평균회귀 성향 때문에 작년 한해 부진했던 주식들이 올해 상승을 주도함. 물론, 핵심 경제 지표들이 여전히 부정적 영역에 있단 사실이 부담으로 작용할 것임.>
한국어를 순화해서 사용하려는 노력을 하는 이유는, 가장 쉽고 원초적인 문장으로 내가 이해한 바를 설명할 수 있다면, 그것이 진정으로 내가 시장을 공부하고 내 것으로 만들고 있다고 생각하기 때문이다.
퀀트로 시작해 매크로 펀드까지 두루 다루며 얼마나 많은 용어와 영어와 업계 은어를 접하는지 생각해보면, 내가 흡수한 것을 발산할 때는, 적어도 하나의 의지, 바르고 고운 한국어로 해보잔 생각이 있다.
Docent: 브리지워터의 최고운용책임자들의 견해를 공표하는 자료에 대한 도슨트를 하고자 함. 2022년 각 국 중앙은행들, 특히 미국 중앙은행은 인플레이션을 통제하기 위해 가장 빠른 속도로 금리를 인상하는 정책을 선택했음. 시장 참여자들은 이러한 정책들이 어떤 영향을 가져오는지 판단하기보다, 단순히 실질수익률에 따라 자산을 평가했고, 흥미롭게도 지난 해 대부분 자산군들의 움직임은 중앙은행이 만들어 놓은 실질수익률에 따른 움직임이 전부라 할 수 있을 정도임. 우리가 놓치고 있었던 정책의 효과는 서서히 나타나고 있으며, 앞으로 더 다가올 것임. 2%대의 인플레이션에 도달하게 된다면 좋겠지만, 그렇지 않을 경우 현재의 긴축을 더 강화해야 할 수도 있음. 그렇다면 정책의 효과가 올바르게 발현되고 있는지 살펴보는데 무엇이 필요할까, 그것을 정리해보면 다음과 같음.
i) 명목소비증가율이 3%~5% 수준으로 회귀해야 할 것이며, ii) 임금상승률 또한 1%~3% 수준으로 낮아져야 할 것임. iii) 이 두 조건이 안정적 물가 상태에서 완전고용이라는 중앙은행이 가진 두 책무를 동시에 완성하게 할 것임. iv) 다만, 이를 위해서는 현재의 상태에서 상당한 실업률 증가, 실질경제성장률 하강 등이 필요함. v) 그 내면을 좀 더 들여다보면, 노동시장의 수요와 공급을 일치시키면서 인플레이션을 진정시키기 위해서 실업률이 최소 2% 증가하고, 실질경제성장률은 2% 감소해야 하며, 기업들의 이익 또한 20% 정도 감소하면서 노동자 해고에 대한 유인이 발생할 수준에 이르러야 할 것임.
The US, and to some extent European economies, entered 2022 with a head of steam. MP3 policies had worked, transitioning economies from collapse to liftoff and extremely high nominal growth, high nominal spending, and income growth that was outpacing supply and producing inflation. The policies had also produced a layer of excess liquidity that drove asset prices higher and left a store of liquidity in the hands of people and the financial system. Central banks, particularly the Fed, faced the decision to either tighten at a much faster rate than discounted or risk the growing inflation pressures becoming entrenched. The effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine worsened the already dire inflation picture. The Fed chose tightening at a rapid pace. The speed and magnitude of the monetary tightening of 2022 were among the most aggressive in history. Every movement by the Fed and other central banks was essentially the only thing driving markets, with almost every asset moving in line with its relationship to real interest rates. In the end, the markets priced in the movement in real yields. Interestingly, the markets have not priced in what we see as the very likely effects of the tightening. The tightening’s impact on markets was big and pervasive, but its impact on economies has not yet been fully felt. The effects are coming, and if they don’t, then more tightening will be required until there is a sufficient loosening of labor markets to bring wage inflation down to a level that is consistent with sustainably achieving inflation targets. We see a number of changes that must occur for inflation to rest sustainably near the 2% level, most of which are not priced in.
• Nominal spending growth must fall back to the range of 3–5%, as it was during the past couple of decades when inflation oscillated around central bank targets. But that will not be enough on its own.
• To achieve sustainable equilibriums, you need that level of nominal spending growth while at the same time having near-target real growth rates. That requires wage inflation to move back into the 1–3% range, similar to the past few decades.
• Given nominal spending growth of 3–5% and wage inflation around 2%, it is possible to achieve the dual mandate of full employment with stable prices; i.e., at-potential real GDP growth, at-potential output, and near-target 2% inflation.
• But given the current starting point, restoring equilibrium conditions will require an extended adjustment period of low nominal spending growth, negative real growth, and rising unemployment.
• Back of the envelope, that implies at least a 2% rise in unemployment sustained over a long enough period of time to adjust the supply/demand balance for labor, a 2% decline in real GDP, and about a 20% decline in operating earnings as an inducement for the necessary layoffs.
i) 명목소비증가율이 3%~5% 수준으로 회귀해야 할 것이며, ii) 임금상승률 또한 1%~3% 수준으로 낮아져야 할 것임. iii) 이 두 조건이 안정적 물가 상태에서 완전고용이라는 중앙은행이 가진 두 책무를 동시에 완성하게 할 것임. iv) 다만, 이를 위해서는 현재의 상태에서 상당한 실업률 증가, 실질경제성장률 하강 등이 필요함. v) 그 내면을 좀 더 들여다보면, 노동시장의 수요와 공급을 일치시키면서 인플레이션을 진정시키기 위해서 실업률이 최소 2% 증가하고, 실질경제성장률은 2% 감소해야 하며, 기업들의 이익 또한 20% 정도 감소하면서 노동자 해고에 대한 유인이 발생할 수준에 이르러야 할 것임.
The US, and to some extent European economies, entered 2022 with a head of steam. MP3 policies had worked, transitioning economies from collapse to liftoff and extremely high nominal growth, high nominal spending, and income growth that was outpacing supply and producing inflation. The policies had also produced a layer of excess liquidity that drove asset prices higher and left a store of liquidity in the hands of people and the financial system. Central banks, particularly the Fed, faced the decision to either tighten at a much faster rate than discounted or risk the growing inflation pressures becoming entrenched. The effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine worsened the already dire inflation picture. The Fed chose tightening at a rapid pace. The speed and magnitude of the monetary tightening of 2022 were among the most aggressive in history. Every movement by the Fed and other central banks was essentially the only thing driving markets, with almost every asset moving in line with its relationship to real interest rates. In the end, the markets priced in the movement in real yields. Interestingly, the markets have not priced in what we see as the very likely effects of the tightening. The tightening’s impact on markets was big and pervasive, but its impact on economies has not yet been fully felt. The effects are coming, and if they don’t, then more tightening will be required until there is a sufficient loosening of labor markets to bring wage inflation down to a level that is consistent with sustainably achieving inflation targets. We see a number of changes that must occur for inflation to rest sustainably near the 2% level, most of which are not priced in.
• Nominal spending growth must fall back to the range of 3–5%, as it was during the past couple of decades when inflation oscillated around central bank targets. But that will not be enough on its own.
• To achieve sustainable equilibriums, you need that level of nominal spending growth while at the same time having near-target real growth rates. That requires wage inflation to move back into the 1–3% range, similar to the past few decades.
• Given nominal spending growth of 3–5% and wage inflation around 2%, it is possible to achieve the dual mandate of full employment with stable prices; i.e., at-potential real GDP growth, at-potential output, and near-target 2% inflation.
• But given the current starting point, restoring equilibrium conditions will require an extended adjustment period of low nominal spending growth, negative real growth, and rising unemployment.
• Back of the envelope, that implies at least a 2% rise in unemployment sustained over a long enough period of time to adjust the supply/demand balance for labor, a 2% decline in real GDP, and about a 20% decline in operating earnings as an inducement for the necessary layoffs.
Docent: 모건스탠리의 전세계 분석가 45명이 모여 이틀 간 집중적으로 토론한 결과, 급격한 변화의 시대, 단기에 집중하게 된 투자 문화(1960년대 주식의 평균 보유기간은 8년, 그러나 현재는 6개월 남짓)로 인해 되려 장기 추세에 집중함으로써 기회를 얻을 수 있다는 결론을 내림. 이에 대해 도슨트하고 자 함. 이들이 내린 장기적 추세는 아래 세 가지로 요약할 수 있음. i) 세계경제 구조의 재편에 지정학적 위험을 강하게 고려하기 시작할 것임. 특히 러시아와 우크라이나 간 전쟁을 통해 공급망과 상업망 구축에 있어 새로운 장벽과 공급망 재편에 대한 유인이 발생했음. ii) 탄소로부터 독립하는 흐름은 더욱 가파르게 진행 될 것임. 러시아와 우크라이나 간 전쟁에서 에너지의 원천을 수입하는데서 오는 취약함, 유럽 지역의 정책 지원과 미국의 신재생 에너지에 대한 막대한 지출 등이 이 노력이 얼마나 빨라지고 있는지를 단적으로 보여주고 있음. iii) 기술의 확산, 이는 새로운 내용은 아니지만 기술의 확산이 이전에 미치지 않던 분야까지 더욱 빠른 속도와 넓은 폭으로 진행될 것이란데 주목해야 할 것임. 기술의 확산이 영향을 미치게 될 미래 5년은 우리가 지나 온 5년보다 훨씬 클 것임.
Rewiring global commerce for a multipolar world: With the shift from unbridled globalization to a world with more than one meaningful power base and commercial standard, companies and countries can no longer seek efficiencies through global supply chains and market access without factoring in geopolitical risks. While we first flagged this secular trend in 2018, we believe it became the consensus following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the West’s policy response, which created fresh trade barriers and incentives to realign supply chains. Decarbonization: Between 1) Europe’s problematic reliance on imported natural gas being laid bare by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; 2) Growing EU policy support for energy transition infrastructure via the REPowerEU plan; and 3) The US appropriation of $400 billion+ to speed the adoption of clean energy technology, we think it's fair to say that the developed world is accelerating its efforts to reduce carbon emissions. Still, this is a tall order. To reach ‘Net Zero by 2050’, carbon emissions would need to start falling by ~8% per year. Even during 2020, when the lockdowns heavily impacted mobility and global GDP shrank, emissions fell only 5%. In addition, the cost would be significant. The IEA estimates that the energy transition will cost an extra ~$70 trillion over the next 30 years, taking energy spending to 4.5% of global GDP from its current run rate of 2.5%. Tech diffusion: While this is hardly a new theme, what’s different and noteworthy are the speed and breadth with which tech diffusion can impact sectors that were previously untouched. Fragmented industries or those with high regulatory barriers – which have typically not reaped as much tech-driven productivity benefit – suddenly look poised for a multi-year transition via tech diffusion. Opportunities range from embedded finance in consumer user experience and payments, to tokenized assets allowing for greater global financial inclusion, to modernizing healthcare data ownership and biopharma R&D breakthroughs. We expect the next five years of tech diffusion to move meaningfully faster than the last five.
Rewiring global commerce for a multipolar world: With the shift from unbridled globalization to a world with more than one meaningful power base and commercial standard, companies and countries can no longer seek efficiencies through global supply chains and market access without factoring in geopolitical risks. While we first flagged this secular trend in 2018, we believe it became the consensus following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the West’s policy response, which created fresh trade barriers and incentives to realign supply chains. Decarbonization: Between 1) Europe’s problematic reliance on imported natural gas being laid bare by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; 2) Growing EU policy support for energy transition infrastructure via the REPowerEU plan; and 3) The US appropriation of $400 billion+ to speed the adoption of clean energy technology, we think it's fair to say that the developed world is accelerating its efforts to reduce carbon emissions. Still, this is a tall order. To reach ‘Net Zero by 2050’, carbon emissions would need to start falling by ~8% per year. Even during 2020, when the lockdowns heavily impacted mobility and global GDP shrank, emissions fell only 5%. In addition, the cost would be significant. The IEA estimates that the energy transition will cost an extra ~$70 trillion over the next 30 years, taking energy spending to 4.5% of global GDP from its current run rate of 2.5%. Tech diffusion: While this is hardly a new theme, what’s different and noteworthy are the speed and breadth with which tech diffusion can impact sectors that were previously untouched. Fragmented industries or those with high regulatory barriers – which have typically not reaped as much tech-driven productivity benefit – suddenly look poised for a multi-year transition via tech diffusion. Opportunities range from embedded finance in consumer user experience and payments, to tokenized assets allowing for greater global financial inclusion, to modernizing healthcare data ownership and biopharma R&D breakthroughs. We expect the next five years of tech diffusion to move meaningfully faster than the last five.
Bottom-line: 블랙락은 선진국 주식보다 신흥국 주식을 선호하며, 회사채에 있어서는 투자등급을 선호한다고 밝혔는데, 그 근간에는 올해 세 가지, i) 선진국이 경기침체에 이를 것이며, ii) 경제가 타격을 입는 지점에서 중앙은행의 금리인상은 중단 될 것이지만, 인플레이션이 여전히 높아 금리인하에는 이르지 못할 것, iii) 이처럼 선진국이 침체에 이를 때 경제를 재개한 중국이 성장을 주도할 것임.
We see three shifts shaping 2023 as the new regime keeps playing out. First, we see DM economies facing recession. Second, DM central banks will halt rate hikes when economic damage is clearer. Goods inflation should fall sharply as spending shifts. But we don’t expect rate cuts as inflation stays above policy targets. Third, China’s reopening and domestic spending will drive global growth as DM recessions hit. We like emerging market stocks over DM and like high grade credit.
We see three shifts shaping 2023 as the new regime keeps playing out. First, we see DM economies facing recession. Second, DM central banks will halt rate hikes when economic damage is clearer. Goods inflation should fall sharply as spending shifts. But we don’t expect rate cuts as inflation stays above policy targets. Third, China’s reopening and domestic spending will drive global growth as DM recessions hit. We like emerging market stocks over DM and like high grade credit.
Bottom-line: 달러에 대한 주요국 통화가 연 초 이후 강세를 보이면서 달러지수가 근 9개월래 최저치에 근접함. 제이피모건자산운용에서부터 골드만삭스자산운용에 이르기까지 중앙은행이 금리인상을 5% 미만 수준에서 멈출 것으로 기대하는 베팅을 계속하면서, 불과 2주만에 작년 가장 뜨거웠던 ‘달러 매수’ 거래가 거시적 운용에서 가장 큰 규모의 ‘공매도’로 변했음.
Investors are selling the dollar in droves as bets mount that the Federal Reserve will slow the pace of its interest-rate hikes. The Bloomberg Dollar Spot Index fell to the lowest in almost nine months on Monday as easing US inflation expectations prompted funds to ditch the ultimate haven asset. Every major currency in the world rallied against the greenback, with the Australian dollar and the yuan advancing to key levels. The dollar’s fortunes have suffered a dramatic U-turn in recent months as funds from JPMorgan Asset Management to Goldman Sachs Group Inc. predict the Fed will soon rein in the pace of its tightening. Traders are now expecting the Fed fund rate to peak at 4.94% from more than 5% earlier this month. “Just two weeks into the year, and it feels like the big ‘buy dollar’ trade of 2022 is turning into the hottest macro short now,” said Patrick Bennett, strategist at Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce in Hong Kong.
Investors are selling the dollar in droves as bets mount that the Federal Reserve will slow the pace of its interest-rate hikes. The Bloomberg Dollar Spot Index fell to the lowest in almost nine months on Monday as easing US inflation expectations prompted funds to ditch the ultimate haven asset. Every major currency in the world rallied against the greenback, with the Australian dollar and the yuan advancing to key levels. The dollar’s fortunes have suffered a dramatic U-turn in recent months as funds from JPMorgan Asset Management to Goldman Sachs Group Inc. predict the Fed will soon rein in the pace of its tightening. Traders are now expecting the Fed fund rate to peak at 4.94% from more than 5% earlier this month. “Just two weeks into the year, and it feels like the big ‘buy dollar’ trade of 2022 is turning into the hottest macro short now,” said Patrick Bennett, strategist at Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce in Hong Kong.
Starting with January 2023 data, the BLS plans to update weights annually for the Consumer Price Index based on a single calendar year of data, using consumer expenditure data from 2021. This reflects a change from prior practice of updating weights biennially using two years of expenditure data.
Docent: COVID-19로 인해 많은 거시경제 지표와 경제활동 자료들이 왜곡 된 탓에 이동평균하는 기간을 더 길게 잡거나, 전년 대비 성장률을 2개년도로 합치는 등의 보정 작업이 있었음. 모건스탠리의 한국 수출 자료 또한 2021년에도 그러한 작업이 진행됐었음. 이번에 미국 소비자물가지표의 산출 방법이 위와 반대로 2년에서 1년으로 줄어듬이 어떤 효과를 보일지 단적으로 보여주는 것이 수출 차트임. 산정하는 기간을 늘리면 노란색 부분이 되고, 산정하는 기간을 줄이면 파란색이 되므로, 물가 또한 이전보다 더욱 가파르게 움직이게 될 것임.
The BLS plans to update weights annually for the Consumer Price Index based on a single calendar year of data.
The BLS plans to update weights annually for the Consumer Price Index based on a single calendar year of data.